Dialogo Tra Essere E Nulla: Seconda Parte

DIALOGUE BETWEEN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: PART TWO

The second part of the "Dialogue Between Being and Nothingness" delves into philosophical reflections on becoming, being, and the tension between Heraclitean flux and Parmenidean permanence. Drawing on Platonic dialogues such as *Theaetetus*, *Cratylus*, and *Sophist*, as well as Aristotle's interpretation, the text explores the relationship between change and identity, the epistemological challenges of Heraclitean thought, and the metaphysical implications of Parmenides' assertion of the unchanging nature of being. Plato is shown to navigate a middle path, acknowledging Heraclitean insights on flux while positing the Theory of Ideas to reconcile change with the principle of non-contradiction. This synthesis underpins his metaphysical framework, which transcends sensory experience to reveal a realm of immutable forms. The discussion also critiques the oversimplification of early philosophical ideas by later interpretations, including Hegel's and Heidegger's views on being and nothingness. Ultimately, the text emphasizes Plato's notion of the "instant" as a unique metaphysical state bridging movement and stillness, offering a profound resolution to the paradox of becoming.
2023

Review by Beatrice

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Review by Beatrice

**THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN BEING AND NOTHINGNESS** The *Sophist* is a dialogue that confronts us with some Platonic themes that already have their own history. The problem of becoming, as well as the ontological one, considerations on knowledge (*episteme*) and opinion (*doxa*), the method, and dialectics would each require further examination. ### PART TWO **Becoming is said in many ways** *(Aristotle, Physics, I, 7-190a30)* Being (and being as becoming), which constitutes the authentic object of reflection in this dialogue, is certainly the root of all thought, including the most ancient, and always refers to diverse meanings. The "many ways of speaking about being" and the "multiple senses" inherent to "becoming" continue, with Aristotle, to constitute the classical problem of ancient philosophy. Heraclitus is remembered in the history of philosophy as the philosopher of becoming. However, one may doubt whether Heraclitus's thought centers on universal becoming. It is necessary to examine how much Plato understood Heraclitean thought. In the *Symposium*, Diotima affirms that everything passes and transforms, even our knowledge. Thus, Plato seems to share the Heraclitean position, which he critiques in the *Cratylus* (402a), especially regarding the statement that "one cannot step into the same river twice." According to Aristotle, Plato would have learned this interpretation from the Heraclitean Cratylus, his teacher, who introduced considerable exaggerations of Heraclitean teachings, including the idea that not only can one not step into the same river twice, but not even once. With Aristotle, an attempt is made to establish a law governing this becoming. Plato, who considered Heracliteanism a somewhat crude way of seeing things, nonetheless made these observations: *"On this point (the idea that nothing ever is but always becomes), all philosophers, one after the other, except Parmenides, must be admitted to agree—Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles; and even the greatest poets of both kinds of poetry, Epicharmus in comedy and Homer in tragedy, who, by saying, ‘Ocean is the father of the gods, and Tethys their mother,’ meant that all things arise from the flow and movement.”* (*Theaetetus*, 152e 2-9) Plato thus maintains that almost everyone agrees, even Heraclitus, except for Parmenides. In the *Cratylus*, he confirms that the doctrine of becoming has been taken as a philosophical foundation by almost all the sages. Indeed, we all constantly experience the flow of things and the changes within ourselves through birth, growth, and death. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel, addressing the problem of becoming in Greek thought, declares himself open to Heraclitean propositions. Parmenides, on the other hand, according to Hegel, would have conceived being and nothingness as abstract entities, unrelated to each other, mere voids devoid of content. However, Parmenides opposed the Heraclitean view of the world in a manner far from crude. Heidegger, in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, critiques Hegel and Western philosophy for judging the early philosophers through their own perspectives and misinterpreting Parmenides as merely representing the first moment of undifferentiated being. Heidegger emphasizes the misunderstanding in the history of philosophy, which erroneously highlighted the opposition between Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming. Plato does not fall into the trap of this contrast but identifies in the principle of becoming the negation of another fundamental principle: the principle of identity. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato quotes the famous Protagorean dictum: *"Man is the measure of all things: of those that are, that they are; of those that are not, that they are not."* This initiates a long discussion in which Plato seeks to show that accepting this view renders it impossible to achieve truth and any certainty about the world. Plato interprets Protagoras's "man" as the individual subject to the ever-changing circumstances of life. However, Platonic discussion proceeds, leaving unresolved the "unsettling" Heraclitean thought. The internal, constant, and irremediable contradiction of everything is the true Heraclitean thought that continues to unsettle Platonic considerations of truth, which are expanded in *The Sophist*, the dialogue following *Theaetetus*. Plato critiques the principle of becoming and Protagoras not to deny their importance but to highlight the absence of a broader perspective that redeems and compensates for absolute mutability. While Plato does not reject the Heraclitean doctrine, he hints at another dimension of being: between unceasing becoming and stillness lies the instant, the eternal, which is a sacred dimension. With Plato and Aristotle, thought gradually departs from Heraclitean perspectives. For Aristotle, "being is said in many ways," yet always respects the principle of non-contradiction. Heraclitus's affirmation of the univocity of being deafens one to the Logos, to its richness and multiplicity. Words themselves are signs of the contradictory nature of truth. Within a single word, not only its explicit meaning can be found but also its opposite, if one pays attention. The word is war. Parmenidean thought seems a response to Heraclitus: either one adopts the position of the sophists or assumes that certain positions are valid as long as thought remains within the everyday realm of *doxa* and becoming. But when one enters the dimension of reason and truth, being is thinking and saying; truth is univocal and one. For Parmenides, being *is said in only one way*; it is univocal because it is simple. This opens the way to great Western metaphysics by separating the physical plane from a different plane that lies beyond sensory experience. Parmenides seems to be the sage who identifies the implications of Heraclitus's affirmation of the divergence between thought and thing and seeks to open another path for philosophical thought and knowledge. In *Theaetetus*, Plato has Socrates say that the Parmenidean doctrine is too difficult to explain in ordinary philosophical language. Yet, since no other language exists, in *Parmenides*, Plato likely speaks of parricide (where the victim would be Parmenides, the father). Plato critiques the univocal and simple Parmenidean idea of being and thus opens another path, which is not metaphysical, because it is neither scientific discourse nor logic but the path of the instant, which is a state, a mode of being. There exists a state outside time, which is the instant, and it is only in this sort of "extraordinary state," poised between movement and stillness, that becoming occurs. The instant not only outlines a possible solution to the problem of movement and becoming but also represents a unique metaphysical state, beyond time and beyond the characteristics of things that are. Plato's *Theory of Ideas* offers a solution to the aporia of becoming. Through it, phenomena can be preserved without violating the principle of non-contradiction, synthesizing Heraclitean and Parmenidean thought. Being is immutable not as an entity but as an idea, the single intelligible species within a multiplicity of objects. The *Theory of Ideas* resolves the discord between reason and experience. *The Sophist* is the foundational text for overcoming this discord, transforming the *Theaetetus*'s epistemological implications of the *Theory of Ideas* into metaphysical and ontological significance.

10-Aug-2023 by Beatrice